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X-Original-Date Tue, 05 Nov 2002 115206 +0100

Date Tue, 05 Nov 2002 115206 +0100

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Explosive Revelation$

http//www.inthesetimes.com/issue/26/10/feature1_1.shtml

The world's biggest banks and multinational

corporations have set up a shadowy system to secretly move

trillions of dollars; a system that can be exploited by

tax evaders, drug runners and even terrorists.

 

Ernest Backes, circa 1986.

Ernest Backes exposed this dubious system and has launched a

personal crusade for international oversight, earning

him some high-powered and dangerous enemies.

by Lucy Komisar

 

In the tax haven of Luxembourg, a little-known outfit called

Clearstream handles billions of dollars a year in stock and

bond transfers for banks, investment companies and

multinational corporations. But a former top official of

this "clearinghouse" says Clearstream operates a

secret bookkeeping system that allows its clients to hide

the money that moves through their accounts.

 

In these days of global markets, individuals and companies

may be buying stocks, bonds or derivatives from a seller who

is halfway across the world. Clearinghouses like Clearstream

keep track of the "paperwork" for the

transactions. Banks with accounts in the clearinghouse use a

debit and credit system and, at the end of the day, the

accounts (minus "handling fees," of course) are

totaled up. The clearinghouse doesn't actually send

money anywhere, it just debits and credits its

members' accounts. It's all very efficient. But

the money involved is massive. Clearstream handles more than

80 million transactions a year, and claims to have

securities on deposit valued at $6.5 trillion.

 

It's also an excellent mechanism for laundering drug

money or hiding income from the tax collector. Banks are

supposed to be subject to local government oversight. But

many of Clearstream's members have real or

"virtual" subsidiaries in offshore tax havens,

where records are secret and investigators can't trace

transactions. And Clearstream, which keeps the central

records of financial trades, doesn't get even the

cursory regulation that applies to offshore banks. On top of

that, it deliberately has put in place a system to hide many

of its clients' transactions from any authorities who

might come looking.

 

According to former insiders

Clearstream has a double system of accounting, with secret,

non-published accounts that banks and big corporations use

to make transfers they don't want listed on the

official books.

 

Though it is legally limited to dealing with financial

institutions, Clearstream gives secret accounts to

multinational corporations so they can move stocks and money

free from outside scrutiny.

 

Clearstream carried an account for a notoriously criminal

Russian bank for several years after the bank had officially

"collapsed," and clearinghouse accounts

camouflaged the destinations of transfers to Colombian

banks.

 

Banking with Bin Laden

 

Following the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center

and the Pentagon, the United States started focusing its

investigation on the financial trail of Osama bin Laden and

the al-Qaeda network.

 

Like any other large, global operation, international

terrorists need to move large sums of money across borders

clandestinely. In November, U.S. authorities named some

banks that had bin Laden accounts, and it put them on a

blacklist.

 

One was Al TaqwaÑ"Fear of God"Ñregistered in the

Bahamas with offices in Lugano, Switzerland. Al Taqwa had

access to the Clearstream system through its correspondent

account with the Banca del Gottardo in Lugano, which has a

published Clearstream account (No. 74381).

 

But bin Laden may have other access to the unpublished

system. In what he calls a "spectacular

discovery," Ernest Backes reports that in the weeks

before CEO André Lussi was forced to leave Clearstream last

May, a series of 16 unpublished accounts were opened under

the name of the Saudi Investment Company, or SICO, the

Geneva holding of the Saudi Binladen GroupÑwhich is run by

OsamaÕs brother, Yeslam Binladen (some family members spell

the name differently).

 

Yeslam Binladen insists that he has nothing to do with his

brother, but evidence suggests SICO is tied into

Osama"s financial network. SICO is associated with Dar

Al-Maal-Al-Islami (DMI), an Islamic financial institution

also based in Geneva and presided over by Prince Muhammed Al

Faisal Al Saoud, a cousin of Saudi King Fahd, that directs

millions a year to fundamentalist movements. DMI holds a

share of the Al Shamal Islamic Bank of Sudan, which was set

up in 1991 and partly financed by $50 million from Osama bin

Laden.

 

Furthermore, one of SICO's administrators, Geneva

attorney Baudoin Dunand, is a partner in a law firm, Magnin

Dunand & Partners, that set up the Swiss financial services

company SBAÑa subsidiary of the SBA Bank in Paris, which is

controlled by Khaled bin Mahfouz. MahfouzÕs younger sister

is married to Osama bin Laden.

 

 

Clearstream operates a computer program that erases the

traces of trades on request from its members.

 

Clearstream was used to try to hide a dubious arms deal

between French authorities and the Taiwanese military.

 

Many of these charges were first made in a controversial

book called Révélation$, written by Denis Robert, a French

journalist, and Ernest Backes, a former top official at the

clearinghouse who helped design and install the computer

system that facilitated the undisclosed accounts. The

book's impact was explosive. Six European judges

called it "the black box" of illicit

international financial flows. Top Clearstream officials

were fired. The scandal made headlines in big European

newspapers; TV networks broadcast specials; the French

National Assembly's financial crimes committee held a

hearing. Luxembourg authorities ordered an investigation,

and then they effected a cover-up. Yet Révélation$ remains

unpublished and relatively unknown in the United States.

 

A bearded, heavyset man in his mid-fifties, Backes spoke

with In These Times in Neuchâtel, Switzerland, where

he'd gone to attend a conference on international

crime, and explained how he'd started fighting

"organized crime in banking."

 

Click here to read about Clearstream's connection to

the October Surprise.

Ernest Backes was born in 1946 in Trier, Germany. (As he

likes to joke, "There were two important people born

in Trier; the other is Karl Marx.") His father was a

Luxembourg metal worker, his mother a German nurse. From 14,

he worked on an assembly line to pay for school and joined

the Young Catholic Workers. After a job in the Luxembourg

civil service, he was hired in 1971 by Clearstream's

predecessor Cedel (short for "central delivery"

office), set up the year before by a consortium of 66

international banks. Backes helped design and install

Cedel's computerized accounting system in the

'70s.

 

Cedel and its main competitor, Brussels-based Euroclear,

were started to manage transfers of

"eurodollars," U.S. currency kept in banks

outside the United States. According to Barbara

Garson's book Money Makes the World Go Around,

eurodollars were invented in the '50s by the Chinese

and the Soviets so they would not have to put their assets

in banks where the U.S. government could seize them. But

others saw value in eurodollars, and they began to be traded

for other currencies. Some banks attracted eurodollars with

higher interest than was being paid in America, and U.S.

corporations and individuals began using the accounts to

avoid laws on domestic banks. The euromoney market was born.

(By the '90s, the Federal Reserve estimated that about

two-thirds of U.S. currency was held abroad as eurodollars.)

 

Cedel and Euroclear eventually expanded into handling

transfers of stock titles and other financial instruments.

Their clients needed a system that would guarantee the

creditworthiness of their trading partners and keep records

of the trades. The clearinghouses provided speed,

discretion, and a system that didn't make the records

of their deals and profits readily accessible to outsiders.

Every few months, a list of members' codes was

distributed. For transfers, members just entered the codes,

and Clearstream handled the deals with no further inquiries.

 

In 1975, several big Italian and German banks wanted to

centralize their accounting and didn't want other

members of Cedel to send transfers through their numerous

individual branches. The Cedel council of

administration, its board of directors&#8212;authorized

banks with multiple subsidiaries not to put all their

accounts on the lists. Backes and Gerard Soisson, then

Cedel's general manager, set up a system of

non-published accounts. A bank would send a transfer to the

code of the headquarters bank, which would send it on to the

non-published account of its subsidiary. The bank would

regulate this operation internally.

 

Soisson authorized each non-published account, which would

be known only by some insiders, including the auditors and

members of the council of administration. As Cedel's

literature to clients explained "As a general rule,

the principal account of each client is published the

existence of the account, as well as its name and number,

are published. ... On demand, and at the discretion of Cedel

Bank, the client can open a non-published account. The

non-published accounts don't figure in any printed

document and their name is not mentioned in any

report."

 

Requests for non-published accounts came from some banks

that weren't eligible, but Soisson turned them down.

 

By 1980, Backes had become Cedel's No. 3 official, in

charge of relations with clients. But he was fired in May

1983. Backes says the reason given for his sacking was an

argument with an English banker, a friend of the CEO.

"I think I was fired was because I knew too much about

the Ambrosiano scandal," Backes says.

 

Banco Ambrosiano was once the second most important private

bank in Italy, with the Vatican as a principal shareholder

and loan recipient. The bank laundered drug- and

arms-trafficking money for the Italian and American mafias

and, in the '80s, channeled Vatican money to the

Contras in Nicaragua and Solidarity in Poland. The corrupt

managers also siphoned off funds via fictitious banks to

personal shell company accounts in Switzerland, the Bahamas,

Panama and other offshore havens. Banco Ambrosiano collapsed

in 1982 with a deficit of more than $1 billion. (Unknown to

many moviegoers, Banco Ambrosiano inspired a subplot of The

Godfather Part III.)

 

Several of those behind the swindle have met untimely ends.

Bank chairman Roberto Calvi was found hanged under

Blackfriars Bridge in London. Michele Sindona, convicted in

1980 on 65 counts of fraud in the United States, was

extradited to Italy in 1984 and sentenced to life in prison;

in 1986, he was found dead in his cell, poisoned by

cyanide-laced coffee. (Another suspect, Archbishop Paul

Marcinkus, the head of the Vatican Bank, now lives in Sun

City, Arizona with a Vatican passport; U.S. authorities have

ignored a Milan arrest warrant for him.)

 

Just two months after Backes' dismissal in 1983,

Soisson, 48 and healthy, was found dead in Corsica, where

he'd gone on vacation. Top Cedel officials had the

body returned immediately and buried, with no autopsy,

announcing that he had died of a heart attack. His family

now suspects he was murdered. "If Soisson was

murdered, it was also related to what he knew about

Ambrosiano," Backes says. "When Soisson died,

the Ambrosiano affair wasn't yet known as a scandal.

[After it was revealed] I realized that Soisson and I had

been at the crossroads. We moved all those transactions

known later in the scandal to Lima and other branches.

Nobody even knew there was a Banco Ambrosiano branch in Lima

and other South American countries."

 

After leaving Cedel, Backes got a job in the Luxembourg

stock market, and later became manager of a butchers'

cooperative. But he kept friends inside the clearinghouse

and began to collect information and records about

Cedel's operations.

 

With Soisson out of the way, there was nothing to stop the

abuse of the system. Whereas Soisson had refused numerous

requests to open non-published accounts (from such

institutions as Chase Manhattan in New York, Chemical Bank

of London and numerous subsidiaries of Citibank), Cedel

opened hundreds of non-published accounts in total

irregularity, especially after the arrival of CEO André

Lussi in 1990. No longer were they just sub-accounts of

officially listed accounts, Backes charges. Some were for

banks that weren't subsidiaries or even official

members of Cedel. At the start of 1995, Cedel had more than

2,200 published accounts. But in reality, according to

documents obtained by Backes, Cedel that year managed more

than 4,200 accounts, for more than 2,000 clients from 73

countries.

 

Clearstream was formed in 1999 out of the merger of Cedel

and the compensation company of Deustche Börse (the German

stock exchange). "No accounts are secret,"

insists spokesman Graham Cope. "We are controlled by

the local authorities ... who have access to information on

all accounts. The term &#8216;secret' is misused again

and again. Our customers choose to have unpublished

accounts, which simply means, like a telephone

number, they choose not to display the name and number

in our publications. Customers often have many unpublished

accounts, which they use for their own internal management

purposes to ensure there is no confusion between their

accounts."

 

But Backes thinks otherwise. "I discovered an

increasing number of unpublished accounts," he says.

"There were more unpublished than published accounts,

and a [large] proportion were not sub-accounts of a

principal account, which is what the system was supposedly

for. The owners of these accounts were not inscribed on the

official list of the clients of the firm."

 

Click here to see a flowchart of how this money laundering

scheme works.

How does the system work? Backes explains, for example, that

a bank with a published account could open an unpublished

account for a branch in the Cayman Islands, an offshore tax

haven. A drug trafficker easily could have the Cayman branch

debit cash from his personal account to buy stocks on Wall

Street. The transaction would be handled by Clearstream,

which would transfer the money electronically to a New York

bank that had its own clearinghouse account. Soon the shares

could be sold to buy real estate in Chicago with

"clean" money. But regulators or investigators,

depending only on published accounts, would find it nearly

impossible to trace the money. Backes says Clearstream

employees joke that the company name means "the river

that washes."

 

While clearinghouse clients may want to keep transactions

secret, detailed information on every transfer, including

those via non-published accounts, is listed on daily

"security statements and records to prove

that the stock or cash has been sent. These statements are

stored on microfiche and, under Luxembourg law, must be kept

10 years' for commercial enterprises and 15 years for

banks. A Clearstream insider gave Backes 10 years worth of

these records. "The documents are a mine of

information for any financial inquiry," Backes says.

"The archives of the clearinghouses can contribute to

retracing where funds have gone. The knowledge of the list

and the codes relative to non-published accounts, until now

guarded secrets, offer immense possibilities."

 

Backes notes that similar records exist for the other big

clearinghouses, Euroclear and Swift, also based in Brussels.

"It is possible," he explains, "when one

knows the date of an operation and the bank of entry, to

reconstitute inside the clearing companies the voyage of the

money and stocks or bonds to follow the tracks."

 

Révélation$ charges that Cedel/Clearstream further violated

its own statutes by setting up unpublished accounts for

industrial and commercial companies. With accounts in their

own names, companies could avoid passing through banks or

exchange agents to use the clearinghouse. They thus skirted

mandated due diligence and record-keeping. When Siemens was

proposed for membership, Backes says, some Cedel employees

protested that this violated Luxembourg law. However,

management told them that Siemens' admission had been

negotiated at the highest level.

 

Among the major companies with secret accounts, Backes

discovered the Shell Petroleum Group and the Dutch

agricultural multinational Unilever, one of whose accounts

was associated with Goldman Sachs. On the French TV

broadcast "Les dissimulateurs" ("The

Deceivers") in March 2000, Clearstream President Lussi

simply denied the accounts existed. "Only banks and

brokers are eligible for membership," he said,

"as it has always been the case. No private company

accounts, no commercial or industrial companies."

 

But his own spokesman contradicts this claim.

"Customers of Clearstream can be banks or,

exceptionally, corporate clients who have their own treasury

departments the size of banks," Cope wrote in an

e-mail to In These Times. "We cannot accept CEOs of

multinationals or terrorists and have strict account-opening

procedures to prevent such problems."

 

http//www.inthesetimes.com/issue/26/10/feature1_2.shtml

 

Explosive Revelation$, part 2.

 

By 2000, according to Backes, Clearstream managed about

15,000 accounts (of which half were non-published) for 2,500

clients in 105 countries; most of the investment companies,

banks and their subsidiaries are from Western Europe and the

United States. Most of the new non-published accounts were

in offshore tax havens. The banks with the most

non-published accounts are Banque Internationale de

Luxembourg (309), Citibank (271) and Barclays (200).

 

Backes found numerous discrepancies in the lists he obtained

of the secret accounts. For example, code No. 70287 on the

published list belongs to Citibank NA-Colombia AC in Nassau,

and code No. 70292 is that of the Banco Internacional de

Colombia Nassau Ltd. But on the non-published list, the

numbers both belong to Banco Internacional de Colombia in

Bogota. There's no mention of Citibank. Based on the

published list, members may think they are dealing with two

banks in the Bahamas, one of which is a subsidiary of

Citibank, but anything sent to these establishments goes

directly to the country of cocaine cartels. On the April

2000 Clearstream list, there are 37 Colombian accounts, of

which only three are published. (Richard Howe, spokesman for

Citicorp in New York, declined repeated requests for

comment. Cope declined to talk about any individual

customers or accounts, citing Luxembourg banking secrecy

laws.)

 

Clearstream's dealings with Russian banks are another

area of concern. Menatep Bank, which had been bought in a

rigged auction of Soviet assets and has been linked to

numerous international scams, opened its Cedel account (No.

81738) on May 15, 1997, after Lussi visited the bank's

president in Moscow and invited him to use the system. It

was a non-published account that didn't correspond to

any published account, a breach of Clearstream's

rules. Menatep further violated the rules because many

transfers were of cash, not for settlement of securities.

"For the three months in 1997 for which I hold

microfiches," Backes says, "only cash transfers

were channeled through the Menatep account."

 

"There were a lot of transfers between Menatep and the

Bank of New York," Backes adds. Natasha Gurfinkel

Kagalovsky, a former Bank of New York official and the wife

of a Menatep vice president, stands accused of helping

launder at least $7 billion from Russia. U.S. investigators

have attempted to find out if some of the laundered money

originated with Menatep, which they believed had looted

Russian assets. (The Justice Department declined to comment

on the investigation.)

 

Even though Menatep officially failed in 1998, it oddly

remained on the non-published list of accounts for 2000.

(Clearstream also lists 36 other Russian accounts, more

non-published than published.) Kathleen Hawk, a U.S.

spokeswoman for Clearstream, says that was "a

mistake." But Cope contradicts her "Closed

accounts remain on our files and systems even though

they're non-active because we don't reuse

numbers. We keep the records for many years so there is no

future confusion from reused numbers."

 

But Backes explains that there's no systematic rule

about delisting canceled accounts. He found that "some

that didn't exist any longer were on the list. Others

were delisted when they didn't exist. And still other

accounts were delisted, when we knew they existed, though

the numbers no longer appeared."

 

Régis Hempel, a computer programmer who worked for

Clearstream, says some dormant accounts were activated for

special transactions. "Such an account can be opened

in the morning, used for a transaction, and closed to appear

as delisted in the evening," Backes explains.

"Only the guy who gave the order to open it in the

morning knows about the transaction. An investigator or

auditor would not look at such an account because it

doesn't appear on the accounts list."

 

Hempel also claims that Clearstream erased the records of

some transfers. In testimony before the French National

Assembly's financial crimes committee last year, he

explained that a computer system had been developed to wipe

out the traces of transactions in non-published accounts.

When a bank wanted to carry out such a transaction, Hempel

testified, it simply contacted a Cedel staff person.

"We made a `hard coding' in the program

and corrected the instruction that was going to come,"

he explained. "[An instruction could be] a purchase, a

sale, a movement of funds or a security. We made it

disappear, or we put it on another account. Then, when all

was finished, we put back the old program and removed the

exception. It was not seen or known."

 

He said such requests came every two or three days.

 

Hempel volunteered to help Luxembourg prosecutor Carlos

Zeyen investigate Clearstream. But Hempel says local

authorities seem more interested in blocking an

investigation than in exercising oversight. Zeyen responded

that the inquiry into Hempel's charges hadn't

produced any evidence and dismissed claims that Hempel had

been prevented from seeing relevant files as

"rubbish." In a July 2001 public statement,

Zeyen said the investigation would continue.

 

Luxembourg sources say Zeyen was looking into how Menatep

used the system and also into improper ways André Lussi

might have gained personally. In January, a French judge

took depositions about Menatep corruption. According to

Luxembourg journalist Marc Gerges, writing in the local

newspaper Land, the FBI and the German BKA are also

interested in what might be revealed about the role of

Menatep in the diversion of IMF funds. Gerges says

investigators are also looking to implicate Lussi in

suspected financial swindles conducted through holding

companies and trusts in the offshore financial havens of

Guernsey or Jersey. (Lussi could not be located; his

attorney did not respond to phone and e-mail requests for

comment.)

 

Click here to read about Clearstream's connection with

Bin Laden and al-Qaeda.

The publication of Révélation$ brought forward others with

stories about how Cedel/Clearstream had facilitated

corruption. Joël Bûcher, former deputy general director of

the Taiwan branch of the bank Société Générale, wrote Zeyen

volunteering to testify that SG used the clearinghouse to

hide bribes and to launder money. In his deposition for

Zeyen, which is cited in Denis Robert's new book

on the Clearstream saga, The Black Box, Bûcher said he

had worked for the bank for 20 years, but quit in 1995 out

of disgust at its rampant money-laundering. He said much of

that occurred though a Luxembourg affiliate working through

non-published accounts at Cedel. "Cedel didn't

ask any questions about the origin of funds that would have

appeared suspect to any beginner," he told Robert.

"[As a result] we directed our clientele with funds of

doubtful origin to Luxembourg."

 

In the early '90s, Bûcher contends, Cedel was used to

launder $350 million in illegal "commissions" on

a contract for the sale by Thomson-CSF, a French government

arms company, of six French frigates to Taiwan. He said that

the money, handled by an SG subsidiary, was paid as a

registered securities transfer to a

"nominee", a stand-in for the real

beneficiary, and that Thomson (now known as Thales)

didn't appear in the transaction except in the Cedel

archives.

 

The kickbacks were exposed after the 1993 murder of a naval

captain named Yin Ching-feng, who had written a critical

report on the purchase and its inflated $2.8 billion price.

Bûcher told Taipei authorities that a third of the kickbacks

went to Taiwanese generals and politicians, while the rest

was pocketed by French officials. Taiwan courts sentenced 13

military officers and 15 arms dealers to between eight

months and life in prison for bribery and leaking military

secrets.

 

In March, Bûcher will testify before a French court

examining French complicity. "SG is very much

implicated," he told In These Times. "Taipei

police searches found many records of transfers of

commissions" relating to the frigates and also to the

sale of French Mirage fighter planes. In New York, SG

spokesman Jim Galvin denies that the bank had any

involvement in the arms deal.

 

There has been no legal action by the Luxembourg prosecutor

based on any of his investigations. However, Clearstream

Banking, Lussi and others have filed 10 lawsuits for libel

in Luxembourg, France, Belgium and Switzerland against

Backes, Robert and their publisher, Les Arenes. The first

case, Clearstream v. Backes went to court in March in

Luxembourg. Another case began its first hearings in Paris a

few days later. With no sense of irony, the liquidator of

Russia's notorious Menatep Bank is also suing the

authors and publishers for damage to its reputation.

(Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the Russian oligarch who controlled

Menatep, did not respond to a request for comment.)

 

Backes' knowledge and records make him a valuable

investigative partner, and he cooperates with numerous

authorities, though he prefers not to say in which

countries. But his agenda is larger than that. Backes is

lobbying for oversight by an international public body.

Unlike banks, Clearstream has no effective outside

surveillance. It is audited by KPMG, one of the "big

five" international accounting firms, which either has

been ignorant of or has overlooked the non-published

accounts system. KPMG announced last year it found "no

evidence" to support the allegations made in

Révélation$, though its report was not made public.

 

Local officials' attempts to defend financial secrecy

are not surprising. Luxembourg's multi-billion-dollar

financial sector brings in 35 percent of GNP and gives the

inhabitants a per capita income of more than $44,000, the

highest in the world. (Next on the list are Liechtenstein,

Switzerland and Bermuda, all money-laundering centers, with

the United States fifth.) For years, local officials have

refused to provide bank information to other countries.

 

But Luxembourg authorities have turned their sights on

Backes. Using a March 2001 judicial order based on a

complaint made by Lussi before he was fired, police raided

Backes' house on September 19 in search of records. He

says they seized unimportant documents and diskettes; he

keeps the microfiches outside the country as "life

insurance." "The raid was organized to impress

[others] not to repeat what this dangerous guy Ernest Backes

has done," he says. "Those who know me well know

I am not at all impressed by such a raid."

 

Lucy Komisar is a New York journalist who has spent the past

five years investigating the international offshore bank and

corporate secrecy system. To order a copy of Révélation$ (in

French), visit www.arenes.fr.

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