Rumsfeld's Amateurs In Iraq
Monday, 19 May
2003, 1:46 pm
Column: Brian Cloughley
Rumsfeld's Amateurs
In Iraq
By Brian Cloughley - Also published in The Nation (Pakistan)
The study of war covers much more than examination and
analysis of the application of force - or should do if undertaken properly. The
Principles of War, as ameliorated by commonsense and strategic imperatives,
with a well-considered approach to cooperative internationalism, remain the
best guidelines for the conduct of conflict, and the first of these principles
is "the Objective" (US) or "Selection and Maintenance of the
Aim" (British and most Commonwealth).
It is almost a truism that the aim of a military campaign is
political, even if it is expressed as "to eject the Iraqi invader from
Kuwait" (which was a laudably simple - and legal - declaration of intent),
because the outcome will inevitably be "of or concerning the state",
which is the essence of politics. To a defeated country the aftermath of
conflict is of more pressing significance than its recent and demonstrably
humiliating lack of military prowess. There is an inevitable catharsis, a
release of national emotion, that if taken at the tide can result in acceptance
and even endorsement of the conqueror's position. It is the Stockholm Syndrome
of invaded nations : the bonding of the overwhelmed with the victor to the
point that desire for willing cooperation can be harnessed to mutual benefit.
But there has to be a plan made well in advance of invasion
that covers in fine detail the restorative aspects of occupation. It must
resolve and dictate methods of channelling national energy towards achieving
not just reluctant and surly acceptance of the occupying power, but long-term
agreements that will assuage national humiliation and promote harmony and
prosperity. War is not a video game that can be switched off when the goodies
overcome the baddies. There has to be mature thought given to the aftermath.
In the Bush-Blair war on Iraq, we were told, the Aim of the
United States and Britain was to free the world of Iraq's alleged vast holdings
of "weapons of mass destruction", these being defined as nuclear,
biological and chemical weapons and their means of delivery. Bush and Blair
told us that Iraq had "beyond doubt" an active nuclear weapons'
programme ("What more proof do you want?" said Bush at a joint press
conference, when citing a non-existent UN report quoted by Blair).
Vice-president Cheney went much further in announcing the existence of Iraqi
nuclear weapons and Bush enumerated the "25,000 litres of Anthrax, 500
tones of chemicals" and so on, while Blair told Britain that Iraq could
"at 45 minutes notice" launch chemical and biological attacks. None
of these statements has been proved correct, and it seems they were lies told
us by the president and vice-president of the United States and the prime
minister of Britain. These dishonourable men fooled their own citizens and
bombed Iraq and killed, at the smallest estimate, 2400 Iraqi civilians. Last
week Bush exulted in victory over a fifth-rate, rag-bag, incompetent army that
had dilapidated weapons more suited to museums than battlefields and no air
force whatever. And now he is making a hash of administering the country he
invaded.
Even in the first, darkest, years of the Second World War the
British began formation of an organisation eventually known as AMGOT : the
Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories. It was composed of experts,
mainly civilians in uniform (some of whom became absurdly pompous in the ranks
they were granted), who knew all about railways, economics, water reticulation,
coal mines, ports, vegetables, airfields, government and a great deal more. In
short : they could run a country. They were especially knowledgeable in
political, social and religious affairs, and understood exactly what made
everything tick in the region to which they were accredited. (This was notable
in Italy when the Sicily invasion force included a vast AMGOT team which in a
remarkably brief period established total empathy with some elements of the
population. Unfortunately the US mission had been taken over by a uniform-clad
member of the New York Mafia, Colonel Charles Poletti. Mussolini, for all his
faults, had almost eradicated the Mafia, but the American liberators brought it
back to lucrative life. Such are the ironies of life.) Somewhat unkindly, AMGOT
became known by its denigrators as 'Amateur Military Gentlemen On Tour', but it
cannot be denied that the organisation conducted effective administration of
occupied territories.
Good planning ensured there were enough soldiers to ensure
immediate security on invasion. Good advice by AMGOT resulted in fresh troops
arriving quickly and in greater numbers to perform hands-on restorative tasks
in concert with such local authorities as still might be functioning. It wasn't
easy, but in general the work of the occupation authority was done efficiently
and with dispassionate attention to conquered peoples. This is far from the
case in Iraq, where the main occupying power, the US, has cocked the whole
thing up in spades. (British-run Basra is a quiet success story.)
First, the US Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, ignored advice
that an invading force needs twice as many troops coming behind as there are in
the first waves. The man knows nothing of the art of war, and is an arrogant,
blinkered oaf.
Second, the administrator appointed by Rumsfeld to run Iraq
was a known supporter of Israel. No way could General Garner have been accepted
by a Muslim nation, and anyway he is not a "people person". This was
just another stupid move by Rumsfeld, who was warned that the appointment was
inadvisable. On arrival Garner and his staff took over a presidential palace.
They slept on camp beds - but in a comfortable mansion having enormous
electricity generators. They should have pitched tents and used hurricane
lamps, with provision of electricity being confined to communications' trucks.
Their luxury greatly annoyed the locals without electricity - but they,
incidentally, are laughing themselves silly about almost the entire team of
administrators having been stricken by Montezuma's Revenge. Well, they haven't
got much else to laugh about, because their conquerors have loused up the
occupation.
Next, the officials of Garner's Office of Reconstruction and
Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) who venture out of the former palace -
apparently a rare occurrence - are driven around in SUVs escorted by a troop of
armoured vehicles bristling with machine guns. This is dumb, too, because they
should be on foot or in a jeep, unarmed and escorted by an interpreter. That
creates confidence. But nobody thought about interpreters (except the State
Department's Barbara Bodine, and she was sacked for her temerity in pressing to
have them, and for criticising the shambles), so ORHA, the AMGOT de nos jours,
can't speak to many people, and none at the basic working level. Then ORHA
found it had no say as to what facilities should be commandeered by the army,
which resulted in schools and hospitals being taken over as barracks - a major
disaster that has had wide-reaching effects in fuelling contempt for the
invader. This was almost as stupid as making a Sunni Muslim mayor of Najaf, the
Shia city, to which the reaction has been amazed incredulity.
The whole operation was bungled, and this was entirely the
fault of Rumsfeld and his immediate circle. The US Army chief, General
Shinseki, was sidelined and vilified by Rumsfeld's people after he said
"several hundred thousand soldiers" would be needed in post-war Iraq.
He was right, of course, but Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld's arrogant and equally
ignorant number two, said he was "way off the mark". Shinseki was
thereafter a non-person, and Rumsfeld made a point of calling on Shinseki's
deputy to attend him for public appearances. (And, I hear, will promote him to
take over. There's a moral there, somewhere.) Then last Thursday Rumsfeld
admitted to a Senate Committee that another 15,000 soldiers were being sent to
Iraq. In fact there are many more on the way, and units expecting to return
home have had their tours extended.
Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz ignored the requirement to make an
occupation plan, then chose a team at the last minute while fighting with the
State Department over who should have responsibility. Most people selected were
either incompetent (Garner) or competent to the point of embarrassment
(Bodine), so were sacked after only three weeks. But can Iraqis regard the new
supremo, the abrasive counter-terrorism expert, L Paul Bremer III, with other
than suspicion? His background is State Department but he reports direct to
Rumsfeld, which is the kiss of death for transparency, flexibility, decency and
honesty. 'Amateur Military Gentlemen On Tour' may have been an appropriately
humorous translation of the acronym AMGOT sixty years ago. In Iraq ORHA is
supposed to means Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs. Perhaps it
would be better described as the Office of Rumsfeld's Hamfisted Amateurs.
